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Issues in the Netherlands
Jeroen J. M. Kremers
9.1 Introduction
The pension system of the Netherlands consists of three pillars: (1) a
state-ﬁnanced basic pension at minimum wage level, supplemented by (2)
a collective pension ﬁnanced by employees and employers typically at a
level of 70 percent of prepension gross earnings (compulsory pension
funds); and, on top of that, (3) an old age provision ﬁnanced by an individ-
ual person (free choice of saving, investment, and life insurance products).
The basic pension is ﬁnanced on a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) basis through
premium payments as well as through the general government budget,
while the ﬁnancing of both of the supplementary pension components is
funded on a capital basis. The basic features of this three-pillar pension
system were established immediately after World War II.1 Soon after, large
part of the labor force was participating in premium payment and the
accumulation of pension saving began.
The mix within this three-pillar system is such that the Netherlands cur-
rently boast what is perhaps the most funded collective pension system in
the world. Although the country may thus seem relatively well placed to
cope with the prospective increasing of the pension burden, several as-
2912. Population projections may ﬂuctuate over time; compare the numbers of table 9.1 with
(for example) Kotlikoﬀ and Leibfritz (1998, quoting World Bank Projections 1994). Table 9.1
for the Netherlands is based on Central Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS; 1999), the most
recent national population forecast, also used in recent studies such as Ministerie van Finan-
cie ¨n (2000) and Ewijk et al. (2000). Employing diﬀerent methodologies, Eurostat (2000) see
the ratio of persons aged sixty-ﬁve and older to those aged twenty to sixty-ﬁve increasing
from 22 percent in 2000 to 45 percent in 2050, and United Nations (1998) see it increasing
even to 55 percent. The former projection lies within the 95 percent conﬁdence band of the
CBS projection; the latter does not.
pects of the Netherlands pension system remain that would beneﬁt from
reform.
This paper ﬁrst summarizes, from an international perspective, the ﬁ-
nancial challenges for the Netherlands pension system given the prospec-
tive population aging (section 9.2). Subsequently, in section 9.3, the main
features of the three-pillar system are explained in more detail. Issues for
reform are the subject of section 9.4.
9.2 Aging and the Costs of Financing Old Age Income
This section investigates the extent to which the aging of the population
is expected to lead to deﬁciencies in the ﬁnancing of pension beneﬁts. It
describes the level and composition of current beneﬁts, and subsequently
assesses potential diﬃculties in continuing to ﬁnance this beneﬁt system
in the future. First, however, the prospective population aging itself is
placed in an international perspective.
Projections indicate that the Netherlands will be confronted with a sub-
stantial aging of the population (table 9.1). In 2000, the number of persons
older than age sixty-ﬁve relative to those aged twenty to sixty-ﬁve stands
at about 22 percent. This is roughly expected to double to something in
the order of 40 percent or higher in 2050.2
Will such a substantial aging of the population pose major ﬁnancing
diﬃculties? That depends on the level of beneﬁts, their composition be-
tween funded and nonfunded components and the degree to which each
component’s ﬁnancing source is adequate in view of the prospective aging.
Given myriad institutional diﬀe r e n c e si ti sd i ﬃcult to make precise in-
ternational comparisons of the level of beneﬁts. Nevertheless, some indica-
tion can be gleaned from replacement ratios, deﬁned as disposable income
during retirement as a percentage of disposable income preretirement. For
most countries within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) area, this ratio typically is on the order of 70–80
percent. Recent computations tend to place the Netherlands at the high
end of this range (e.g., OECD 1998, 1999).
Can these beneﬁts be ﬁnanced when recourse to them rises with the
increasing number of pensioners? The prospects in the case of the Nether-
lands are as follows.
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Until a few years ago, the ﬁrst pillar (Algemene Ouderdoms Wet [AOW],
the general old age law) was ﬁnanced exclusively on a PAYGO basis. Pre-
miums were paid by employees at a rate of about 17–18 percent of the ﬁrst
two brackets of income taxation (see the next section for more detail).
Without further policy action, this rate would be set to rise considerably
with the upward trend of the number of beneﬁt recipients relative to the
active labor force. This would place upward pressure on the wedge be-
tween gross and net earnings, and thus erode incentives to work.
The government has taken two initiatives to help avoid this. First, as of
1998 it has embarked on a temporary, earmarked reduction of the public
debt until 2020 that will subsequently be used up for ﬁnancing the AOW
peak of 2020–50. This is the so-called AOW Fund, a “virtual” fund within
the government budget and economically meaningful to the extent that it
is reﬂected in declining public debt. In 2000 the fund’s size is a mere 1.8
percent of gross domestic product (GDP); in years to come it will be fed
with annual contributions on the order of 0.6 percent of GDP. This is
projected to add up to a size suﬃc i e n tt oa b s o r bt h etemporary hump of
AOW costs during 2020–50. Current estimates show that the accrual of
the AOW Fund during 1998–2002 indeed goes hand in hand with (much
more substantial) debt reduction; the ratio of public debt to GDP is pro-
jected to fall from 70 percent in 1997 to 50 percent in 2002.
Table 9.1 Population Aging
2000 2050 Increase
Europe
Spain 27 66 39
Italy 29 67 38
Germany 26 53 27
France 27 51 24
Belgium 28 50 22
United Kingdom 26 46 20
Netherlands 22 40 18
Denmark 24 42 18
Sweden 30 46 16
Other OECD
Japan 27 64 37
Canada 21 44 23
Australia 20 40 20
United States 21 39 18
Sources: CBS (1999) for the Netherlands and Eurostat (2000) for other Europe; United Na-
tions (1998) for other OECD.
Notes: Persons above age sixty-ﬁve relative to persons aged twenty to sixty-ﬁve; in percent.
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of GDP in 2035; see Ministerie van Financie ¨n (2000).
Second, as of 1998 the AOW premium rate is maximized (at a level of
18.25 percent of the ﬁrst two income tax brackets). AOW costs rising
above this level, corresponding with about 5 percent of GDP, will be ﬁ-
nanced by contributions from the central government budget. Current
projections indicate that such contributions will have to begin from about
2010, climbing to a permanent level equal to 3 percent of GDP as of about
2030.3 This may be ﬁnanced by permanently reducing the public debt to
GDP ratio before then, making permanent room in the budget through
lower interest payments. Recent estimates show that a permanent raising
of the annual budget balance by about 0.6 percent of GDP as of today and
accordingly a reduction of the debt to GDP ratio to zero within twenty-ﬁve
years would suﬃce to absorb both the permanent increase of the AOW
burden and the similar rise of public health care expenditure also associ-
ated with the aging of the population (Ministerie van Financie ¨n 2000;
Ewijk et al. 2000). Alternatively, the structurally higher AOW contribu-
tions may have to be ﬁnanced from higher taxation. The eﬀect of the latter
would be that AOW costs will be ﬁnanced in part by AOW recipients
themselves—thereby reducing net beneﬁts in the ﬁrst pillar. With this pre-
mium cap, therefore, there will be less upward pressure on labor tax rates
and less adverse incentive and employment eﬀects emanating from rising
costs in the ﬁrst pillar—the more so to the degree that the public debt to
GDP ratio can be reduced by more than what is accounted for by the
AOW Fund.
As background at this point it is also relevant to note that, more gener-
ally, taxes and social premiums have declined signiﬁcantly in recent years
and are set to decline further with the tax reform and reduction package
of 2001. Relative to a high in the early 1990s, their total has come down
by several percent of GDP and is projected to reach a level below 40 per-
cent of GDP in 2001 (Centraal Planbureau 2000). Having started from a
position with one of the highest tax burdens in the world, the Netherlands
will begin facing the aging challenge with tax and premium levels below
those of most other European countries—(although still substantially
higher than those of many competitors in the rest of the world. This is
relevant with an eye toward maintaining employment and GDP growth as
a basis for ﬁnancing the costs of an aging population.
9.2.2 The Second Pillar
The second pillar of old age income provisions is already fully prefunded
through pension funds, taking into account to an important degree the
prospective aging of the population. Furthermore, given the relative im-
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Pension Funds Life Insurance Total
Netherlands 111 33 144
United Kingdom 78 22 99
Denmark 26 65 91
Sweden 42 23 65
Ireland 53 8 61
Finland 17 17 35
Germany 7 8 15
Portugal 12 1 13
Belgium 5 8 12
Italy 3 5 8
France 6 1 7
Spain 5 0 5
Greece 3 1 4
Austria 2 0 2
Source: Data provided by Pragma Consulting, Brussels.
portance of this pillar, it is not surprising that Dutch pension funds are
among the largest in the world (table 9.2).
Taken together, the ﬁrst and second pillars in the Netherlands account
for a collective old age income provision typically totalling a level of about
70 percent of gross earnings before retirement (higher when measured net
of taxes). This collective provision covers a very high share of the work-
force (table 9.3), currently more than 90 percent.
9.2.3 The Third Pillar
Persons not fully covered by the ﬁrst two pillars may take life insur-
ance provisions for their old age income. Beyond that, such provisions may
also serve to supplement the ﬁrst two pillars at an individual level. As
indicated in the introductory section, it is diﬃcult to compare internation-
ally the adequacy of individual old age income provisions. As far as life
insurance provisions are concerned, available data suggest that here again
the Netherlands stand out, with a relatively high level of accumulated
savings (table 9.2). This may reﬂect in part the advantageous tax treatment
of life insurance for old age income, as further explained in the next
section.
9.2.4 Summary
As an overall conclusion, the Netherlands’ old age system at present
is fully and therefore adequately funded as regards the (relatively large)
second and third pillars. The (relatively small) ﬁrst pillar is unfunded,
and (taking into account the temporary AOW budget fund) its annual
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nently higher by 3 percent of GDP as of 2030. Coping with this ﬁnanc-
ing requirement in the years to come, preferably by achieving public
debt reduction and thus making budgetary room through lower inter-
est payments, is the remaining challenge in ﬁnancing retirement income
as the population ages. Current estimates show that a permanent rais-
ing of the annual budget balance by about 0.3 percent of GDP would
suﬃce.
Finally, it must be noted that all of these quantitative indications can be
quite sensitive with respect to underlying assumptions. For instance, Ewijk
et al. (2000) computed that a one-year-longer life expectancy would double
the required budgetary adjustment.
9.3 The Present Pension System
This section further explains the system consisting of three pillars: basic
collective, supplementary collective, and supplementary individual. The
third pillar, by its nature, can diﬀer widely by individual; this pillar can be
taken to include not only insurance-type products (lifetime annual beneﬁts
after retirement) but also more broadly any other types of capital accumu-
lation contributing to income after retirement (saving, investments includ-
ing owner-occupied housing). Comparisons of its features and relative
importance—both between pillars and internationally—are therefore dif-
ﬁcult to make.
The sum of the ﬁrst two pillars is the collective pension. In the Nether-
lands this typically totals 70 percent of ﬁnal earnings before retirement,
Table 9.3 Coverage of Second-Pillar Pensions (mid-1990s)
Employees Employees
Covered (%) Covered (%)
Europe Other OECD countries
Finland 90 Australia 89
Sweden 90 United States 50
Netherlands 85 Canada 41







Sources: Stanton and Whiteford (1998), Kohl and O’Brien (1998).
296 Jeroen J. M. Kremerswhen retiring at the age of sixty-ﬁve after forty years of employment. Pre-
cise international comparisons are diﬃcult to come by, but nevertheless
this seems to be a fairly usual proﬁle (see Willemsen 1999; OECD 1995,
1998). Within this collective pension total, the ﬁrst pillar in the Nether-
lands provides a state pension at the level of the minimum wage.
More speciﬁcally, the three pillars are organized as described in sec-
tions 9.3.1–9.3.3.
9.3.1 The First Pillar
The ﬁrst pillar consists of the state social security pension scheme (so-
called AOW). Participation is compulsory for all who reside or work in
the Netherlands. Its purpose is to guarantee an income from the age of
sixty-ﬁve. The beneﬁt is ﬂat rate and is linked to the statutory net mini-
mum wage. The accrual rate is 2 percent a year. A full-ﬂedged pension is
built up between the ages of ﬁfteen and sixty-ﬁve. The contribution is cur-
rently 17.9 percent of income (with a general exemption for taxes and
social security contributions for tax payers under age sixty-ﬁve in the ﬁrst
two tax brackets). Since 1998, the AOW premium has been maximized at
18.25 percent. As soon as AOW costs rise, the remainder will be ﬁnanced
through the central government budget.
The beneﬁt is independent of labor history, contributions paid, wealth,
and other old age income. Since 1985, the ﬁrst pillar beneﬁts for couples
have been individualized due to European Commission (EC) legislation.
The beneﬁt for a person with a partner is 50 percent of net minimum wage
if that person is over sixty-ﬁve years of age. If both persons are over sixty-
ﬁve years, the beneﬁt for a couple is 100 percent. The beneﬁt for a single
person over sixty-ﬁve years of age is 70 percent of net minimum wage. A
beneﬁt is seen as a remuneration for labor in a former period and is taxed
accordingly. The gross replacement rate of the national old age scheme
amounts to 45 percent of average earnings. The state pension scheme dis-
bursements currently amount to about 5 percent of GDP.
The ﬁrst-pillar scheme is ﬁnanced on a PAYGO basis. Additionally, the
government has set up a support fund with yearly contributions from the
government budget. This AOW Fund, including accumulated interest, will
be used to contribute to ﬁrst-pillar beneﬁts from 2020 onward (see sec-
tion 9.2).
9.3.2 The Second Pillar
The second pillar concerns labor-related pension schemes, which have
an essential social function in the Netherlands because of the limited level
of ﬁrst-pillar provisions. Pension schemes are administered outside the
company either by insurance companies (group life insurance) or by
industry-wide or company pension funds. Membership by employees is
compulsory whenever an employer oﬀers a pension scheme. Employers
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pension scheme, whenever participation in these schemes is made compul-
sory by the Minister of Social Aﬀairs at the request of social partners
(representative organizations of employers and of employees) in that
branch. More than 90 percent of the working population is currently cov-
ered by occupational pension schemes, of which 77 percent belong to man-
datory industry-wide pension funds (civil servants included; Verzekering-
skamer 2000).
About 9 percent of the working population does not participate in a
second-pillar scheme. Of that group, 2 percent are with employers that do
not oﬀer such a scheme (e.g., very small companies or new companies in
as-yet unorganized sectors, such as areas of information technology), and
7 percent are not eligible (e.g., those who hold small and temporary part-
time jobs). The government is currently preparing policy to broaden par-
ticipation in second-pillar schemes.
These schemes oﬀer many diﬀerent provisions: old age pension, widows’
and widowers’ pension, partners’ pension (in case of enduring cohabita-
tion), orphans’ pension, invalidity pension, bachelors’ pension (if the pen-
sioner is single), temporary old age pension (from the retiring age until the
statutory age of sixty-ﬁve), temporary survivors’ pension (until the age of
sixty-ﬁve of the survivor), and lump-sum disbursement. Of all employees
covered by second-pillar provisions, nearly all are insured against the con-
sequences of old age and premature death. About 75 percent also have
insurance against loss of income due to invalidity. Many have the prospect
of early retirement on a PAYGO basis, under the so-called VUT (Ver-
vroegde UitTreding) system.
Old age, survivors’, and invalidity pensions are usually compulsory.
However, recent measures to reduce ﬁrst-pillar beneﬁts due for invalidity
pensions respectively survivors’ pensions have created a need for more
ﬂexibility within the second pillar. The result is that pension funds gradu-
ally oﬀer more optional provisions, not only for survivors’ and invalidity
pensions, but also for repairing old age pension.
As for old age pensions, 70 percent of employees have an accrual rate
of 1.75 percent per year, which gives deﬁned beneﬁts at a level of 70 per-
cent after forty years of service, mostly related to some ﬁnal pay system
(average gross salary of some recent years, or no past service costs for
career development after the age of ﬁfty-ﬁve). Twelve percent of employees
have accrual rates of less than 1.5 percent per year, mostly belonging to
an average salary system. Deﬁned contribution systems are rare in the
Netherlands. Only about one-half of one percent of employees have such a
provision, often in addition to a deﬁned beneﬁt scheme. Pensioners usually
receive an adjustment for the cost of living.
As for early retirement, the PAYGO VUT systems were developed by
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advance employment opportunities for the younger generations. A typical
condition for early retirement was an uninterrupted span of employment
lasting at least ten years before the moment of early retirement. Initially
guaranteeing a replacement rate of at least 80 percent from the age of sixty
onward (incidentally, even at an earlier age) and without any contribution
of the employees, PAYGO VUT systems proved to be very popular. Obvi-
ously, they also became very expensive for the employer. In combination
with an easily accessed state invalidity pension in the ﬁrst pillar, the system
of early retirement is an important reason for the low labor participation
rates for elderly people in the Netherlands. Government therefore cur-
rently promotes a transformation into a capitalized ﬂexible pension sys-
tem. The friendly tax treatment of the PAYGO early retirement systems
(contributions exempt and beneﬁts taxed, often at a lower rate) will be
phased out in the longer term.
Tax legislation is oﬀering more possibilities for building up pensions
than are generally used by pension funds. An accrual rate of 2 percent per
working year on a ﬁnal-pay basis (2.25 percent if based on average sala-
ries), with a maximum of 100 percent of the ﬁnal salary, is legally accepted.
The retirement age in the pension scheme should be between sixty and sev-
enty in order to be eligible for tax facilities. Retirement at an even earlier
age is possible, but only with an adequate actuarial reduction of beneﬁts.
In the board of pension funds, employers and employees are represented
equally. Types of group life insurance, administered by insurance compa-
nies, are contracted by the employer. Pension funds themselves may rein-
sure (part of) their portfolios with insurance companies. This concerns
about 45 percent of the schemes, for a total of less than 10 percent of em-
ployees, so reinsurance appears to be especially interesting for smaller pen-
sion funds.
Medical checks for entrance are forbidden. The level of contribution is
diﬀerent for each scheme, depending on the ambition of the scheme, the
composition of membership, the diﬀerent risks that are covered, the ad-
justment of pensions, the returns on investments, and the ﬁnancial posi-
tion of the fund. Usually both employer and employee pay part of the
contribution for group provisions. In some schemes, only the employer
pays. Individual provisions usually will be paid entirely by the employee.
The regulatory body for pension funds is the Ministry of Social Aﬀairs,
and for life insurance companies, the Ministry of Finance. The supervisory
body for both pension funds and life insurance companies is the Insurance
Supervisory Board. Schemes in the second pillar are fully funded under
supervision of this board. Investments must be made according to the so-
called “prudent person” principle. There are no quantitative restrictions
on the portfolio investments of pension funds, except the limitation to a
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restriction limits the employer’s inﬂuence with the board of company pen-
sion funds. There is no currency-matching requirement. Investments by
insurance companies are governed by the rules of the Third Life Directive
of the European Union (EU).
The tax treatment of second-pillar schemes is similar to the EET system:
Contributions are exempt, returns on investments are exempt, and beneﬁts
are taxed. Pension funds are exempt from corporation tax. Insurance com-
panies pay corporation tax on proﬁts. Tax facilities, as mentioned, cover
the provision of old age, survivors’, and disability pensions.
Particularly relevant from a labor market perspective, ﬁnally, is how
second-pillar beneﬁts are treated when workers are mobile between ﬁrms.
Until the mid-1990s this treatment was cumbersome, in many cases caus-
ing a signiﬁcant disincentive to labor mobility. Since 1994, however, every
employee has had a legal right to take along the capital corresponding
with his or her accrued rights to a new employer and pension fund. Trans-
fer takes place according to rules of calculation set by the government.
The transferred value of pension rights, accrued under the old scheme
until the moment of mobility, is converted into actuarially equivalent pen-
sion rights under the new scheme. In this sense, all second-pillar beneﬁts
are individually portable within the Netherlands, even the vast majority
that are based on deﬁned beneﬁts. Portability of pensions between EU
member states (other than in the case of a temporary assignment abroad
for the same employer) is generally diﬃcult for everyone, not just for work-
ers from the Netherlands. The diﬃculty is due to very large diﬀerences in
pension and taxation regimes between member states. These diﬀerences
should be placed prominently on the European policy agenda.
9.3.3 The Third Pillar
As mentioned before, this pillar can be taken to include all parts of
old age income provisions. In the Netherlands, individual life insurance
products (up to a limit) enjoy favorable tax treatment similar to that of
collective pension schemes in the second pillar. Beyond that, saving, in-
vestment, and other vehicles are liable to normal income and wealth tax-
ation.
9.4 Pension Reform
Thanks to a long postwar tradition, the Netherlands boast a relatively
soundly ﬁnanced pension system, oﬀering a good starting position for cop-
ing with contemporaneous policy challenges. These challenges can be sum-
marized with two questions: (1) Do old age income schemes oﬀer suﬃcient
room for individual choice? and (2) are these schemes eﬃcient? The pre-
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at the macro level—has been dealt with in section 9.2.
9.4.1 The Room for Individual Choice
Within the three-pillar system, equilibrium is sought between solidarity
and individual choice. The ﬁrst pillar oﬀers every citizen a basic old-age
income provision at minimum wage (and is thus income independent).
This is solidarity at a national level. The PAYGO premium is compulsory
and income dependent (within the ﬁrst two brackets of income taxation).
The second pillar oﬀers employees a supplement, usually up to 70 percent
of some deﬁnition of prepension gross income, collectively within the in-
dustry sector or the company. This is solidarity at the industry or company
level. The premium to fund the second pillar is compulsory and paid by
employers and employees (and, again is income dependent). The third pil-
lar is voluntary and individual. In itself, this three-pillar system oﬀers a
suitable setup for balancing solidarity and individuality. In part, this is a
question of economic eﬃciency. Boender et al. (2000) have shown that
a collective pension for the commonly preferred pension component is
economically eﬃcient (i.e., it is more eﬃcient in reducing risk than is indi-
vidual saving). Finding the right equilibrium is also a political matter; it
concerns the demarcation between the second and third pillar, and the
scope for diﬀerentiation within the second pillar. The latter oﬀers room for
choice insofar as it is permitted by the collective (industry or company)
wage agreement.
Since the 1990s there has been a growing interest in making room for
individual choice. Factors behind this trend have been growing diﬀeren-
tiation in household and labor participation patterns (more singles and
working spouses), and growing labor mobility (changing employers, exit
and reentry according to family circumstances, self-employment).
In principle there are three ways to oﬀer more room for individual
choice. The ﬁrst is quite drastic: Allow individuals to opt out of collective
arrangements and to invest their accrued capital individually. This road
has been followed in the United Kingdom, leading to pension-misselling
diﬃculties. Many persons have been ill advised and have taken risks with
their basic pensions that subsequently turned sour. This road has not been
considered in the Netherlands. Second, the room for individual choice can
be enlarged by reducing the size of the second pillar in favor of the third
pillar, with the total favorable tax treatment kept (see section 9.3) intact.
Third, more room for choice can be oﬀered to some extent within the
second pillar itself. Of these three options, the latter two can be more grad-
ual ways to accommodate shifting societal preferences.
However, there has been no policy of systematically reducing the size
of the second pillar. Employers’ and employees’ organizations have not, in
Pension Reform: Issues in the Netherlands 3014. See, for example, the Vos and Alessi (1998) research report commissioned by the Minis-
try of Finance.
the context of their collective wage agreements, adopted such an approach.
This is remarkable, given that surveys indicate time and again that there
is demand for more individual choice.4 Individual modules have been in-
troduced within the second pillar, however. This can be explained by tax
considerations and by incentives for the parties (employers’ and employ-
ees’ organizations, pension funds) involved.
In the current tax system, a reduction of the second pillar does not auto-
matically lead to more tax-favored room within the third pillar. This is
an important factor. There has been discussion during recent years about
introducing tax neutrality between the second and third pillars (e.g.,
Kremers and Flikweert 1998). This has led to a move in the direction of,
but not quite reaching, such tax neutrality in the new tax regime. As of
2001, all accrued non–tax exempt savings will be taxed at a low rate of 1.2
percent (applying a uniform tax rate of 30 percent to an assumed return
of 4 percent, independent of actual investment returns). This will mitigate
the relevance of the tax exemption for old age provisions.
Incentives of employees’ and employers’ organizations may be relevant
as well. The organizations are the “social partners” deciding on collective
wage agreements, of which second-pillar schemes are a part; they also
form the boards of directors of pension funds active within this pillar. I
am unaware of any systematic empirical research into the degree to which
premium payers’ preferences are reﬂected in their decisions. The scope for
opting out of collective industry schemes is very limited for participating
employers, and nonexistent for employees. Can it be expected that these
organizations actively reduce the scope of “their” second pillar, even if
warranted by participants’ preferences?
It is indicated in this respect that more room for choice has been created
within second-pillar schemes. This concerns, for instance, prepension op-
tions. Collective pension funds have also begun to oﬀer individual third-
pillar products; the demarcation between collective, tax-favored, second-
pillar schemes and the free-market segment of the third pillar is blurring.
This has raised important but still unresolved issues of fair competition
(taxation, use of personal data) and of privacy in using personal data from
collective schemes for making individual oﬀers (see Kremers, van Kem-
pen, and de Groot 1999).
Finally, of speciﬁc labor market relevance is the question of whether the
pension system is amenable to individual choice regarding pension age.
As noted above, the system hitherto has, in eﬀect, contributed to early
retirement and to low labor participation of the aged. With an eye both
toward ﬁnancing the costs of an aging population and toward fully utiliz-
ing the available labor capacity, it will become increasingly important that
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and they reasonably can. Here again, the system’s incentives will need to
be adjusted and more ﬂexibility will be required. To this end, it may be of
interest to consider moving from a ﬁnal-pay pension anchor toward a pen-
sion level deﬁned in such a way that demotion and part-time work at career
end are not penalized. Some pension schemes, for instance, base the pen-
sion level on income at the age of ﬁfty-ﬁve; other formulas are being dis-
cussed by various pension schemes.
9.4.2 The Eﬃciency of Old Age Income Provision
As regards eﬃciency, it is again the second pillar that is of greatest inter-
est. The ﬁrst pillar is organized simply as a general PAYGO scheme
through the central government budget, and there is no debate about the
costs of running it. The third pillar is open to full competitive pressures
within the ﬁnancial market sector.
For the greater part, the second pillar is run by pension funds. These
are the responsibility of social partners (employers and employees, or their
organizations); the government is not directly involved other than by de-
ﬁning the statutory context. Employers are obliged by law and general
policy to participate in industry-wide funds whenever a branch of industry
is deﬁned; employees are obliged to participate in the employer’s scheme.
Given this situation, three elements are of speciﬁc relevance for the eﬃ-
ciency of pension funds: transparency and accountability, employers’
scope for opting out, and ﬁnancial supervision.
As an indication of the importance of second-pillar eﬃciency, it is illus-
trative to mention some recent computations by Ewijk et al. (2000). They
found that a one percent lower pension fund return (keeping the general
interest rate unchanged) would necessitate drastically higher pension con-
tribution rates, and thus, through their tax deductibility, an additional rais-
ing of the annual government budget balance substantially greater than
that already needed to cope with ﬁnancing higher AOW and health care
costs (see section 9.2).
Transparency and Accountability
Until a few years ago, pension funds were not obliged even to publish
an annual report. Reporting requirements were introduced as of 1998, but
the quality of pension fund reporting is still working toward a level cus-
tomary for other ﬁnancial institutions. Such transparency is important to
enhance pressure on pension fund management and boards to deliver ade-
quate performance. Several conditions need to be improved: No informa-
tion is available on administrative costs; transparency requirements are
less developed than those for life insurers; and employees are still not pro-
vided with comprehensive information about accrued rights and the costs
at which beneﬁts are being delivered.
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and previous years).
6. Source: CBS Webmagazine, 2 November 2000 [http://www.cbs.nl].
As regards accountability, it is interesting to note that a great deal of
attention is being paid in public debate to corporate governance in the
Netherlands, stimulated in part by a more active role of pension funds
as shareholders. The corporate governance of pension funds themselves,
however, remains underdeveloped. In addition to transparency, the ac-
countability of pension boards to their members with respect to key topics
such as investment returns, administrative costs, and pension modalities
oﬀered will certainly be on the policy agenda in years to come.
Opting Out by Employers
Also as of 1998, some limited room has been created for companies to
opt out of their industry pension funds when the funds’ investment per-
formance is signiﬁcantly below the usual standards. The criteria for opt-
ing out are severe, and it remains to be seen to what extent opting out
will be viable. Nevertheless, it is a positive eﬀect that the investment per-
formance of pension funds will now be measured and published on a com-
parable basis.5
Financial Supervision
Over the last few years several policy initiatives have been taken to align
the quality of ﬁnancial supervision of pension funds more fully with that
of ﬁnancial institutions in the market sector (especially that of life insur-
ance companies). In one respect, the supervisory regime for pension funds
in the Netherlands is quite amenable to eﬃcient pension production: Mod-
ern ALM techniques are permitted and encouraged within a prudent-
person approach, eschewing artiﬁcial quantitative restrictions (currency,
ﬁnancial instrument) on asset allocation. Dutch pension funds are free to
invest their assets where and how they best see ﬁt within a framework of
modern prudential supervision (geared toward output in terms of risk ver-
sus return, rather than toward input in terms of asset restrictions)—and
indeed they do, as witnessed by their worldwide investment presence. The
share of pension assets invested abroad has risen quickly in recent years,
from 25 percent in 1996 to 60 percent in 1999.6 This undoubtedly reﬂects
in part the introduction of the euro. Even outside the euro area, however,
Dutch pension funds are quite active (in 1998, 25 percent of the total port-
folio was invested outside the euro area; Verzekeringskamer 2000). In
1999, 57 percent of pension fund assets was invested in equity and real
estate (William M. Mercer Company, April 2000). The portfolio structure
per pension fund follows its chosen investment strategy, depending inter
alia on the structure of liabilities (a fund with a younger population will
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more return in the longer term). The largest pension funds tend to diversify
relatively more into equities and worldwide investments, also outside the
euro area. An indication of asset allocation by Dutch pension funds in an
international perspective is given in table 9.4.
Available evidence indicates that the freedom to invest optimally is an
important element of pension eﬃciency (table 9.5). Against this back-
ground, it is of immediate importance to the Netherlands that the upcom-
ing EU Pensions Directive be based (as announced) on the prudent-person
Table 9.5 Pension Fund Asset Returns
Real Total Returna













Sources: European Commission (1999, quoting European Federation for Retirement Provi-
sion [EFRP], OECD, and Pragma Consulting, Brussels).
aAnnual average (1984–98) in local currency, expressed in percent.
Table 9.4 Pension Fund Asset Allocation (1998)
Percent of Total Assets











Sources: Pragma Consulting, Brussels, and William M. Mercer Company.
a1999; data from William M. Mercer Company (April 2000).
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the point of view of the European business sector.
principle.7 The EC’s proposal, published 11 October 2000 (see EC 2000)
is consistent with this practice that has proved so successful in the Nether-
lands and elsewhere.
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Comment A. Lans Bovenberg
This paper provides an excellent overview of the Dutch pension system.
Its main message is that, compared to other European countries, the Neth-
erlands is well placed to cope with aging. This is mainly because the Neth-
erlands features one of the most funded pension systems in the world.
Because I did not ﬁnd much to disagree with in the paper, I will provide
some additional information about the Dutch pension system. I will also
argue that even a country like the Netherlands, which is quite well placed
compared to other countries, still has much work to do in order to address
the aging problem adequately.
Early Retirement
My ﬁrst point of concern in the Netherlands is the low eﬀective retire-
ment age (see table 9C.1). Three major routes facilitate early retirement:
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unemployment beneﬁts (see table 9C.2). Indeed, incentives to retire early
are powerful. Empirical evidence reveals that the ﬁnancial attractiveness
of the three major routes to exit the labor force strongly aﬀect the choice
among these three alternatives.
Disability Beneﬁts
The most popular public scheme for retiring early from the labor force
is the disability program. At present, about a third of the males between
the ages of ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty-four collect a disability beneﬁt (see table
9C.2). As most of you probably know, the disability scheme is already
extremely expensive in the Netherlands. Because the invalidity rates rise
with age, aging makes the disability scheme even more expensive.
Early Retirement Beneﬁts
Occupational early retirement schemes are the second most important
route for early retirement. These so-called VUT (Vervroegde Uittreding, or
early retirement) schemes are negotiated in collective bargaining among
the social partners. At present, about a quarter of the men aged sixty to
sixty-ﬁve collect early retirement beneﬁts. There are two major diﬀerences
with the occupational pensions that are provided after the statutory re-
tirement age of sixty-ﬁve. First, in contrast to regular occupational pen-
sion beneﬁts, early retirement beneﬁts are ﬁnanced on a pay-as-you-go
Table 9C.2 Persons Aged 55–64 by Labor Market Status (1990)
Men Women
Labor Market Statusa 55–59 60–64 55–59 60–64
Employed 54.9 21.1 12.7 4.3
Disabled 31.3 37.7 10.5 10.8
Partly disabled/unemployed 1.8 1.0 0.4 0.3
Early retirement (VUT) 3.9 26.5 0.6 5.1
Social assistance 0.4 0.4 2.4 2.0
Unemployed 4.6 8.7 1.4 1.6
Source: CPB (1999).
aAs a percentage of the population in that age category.
Table 9C.1 Eﬀective Retirement Age
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
Males 66.4 66.1 63.8 61.4 59.3 58.8
Females 64.1 63.7 62.9 58.4 55.8 55.3
Source: CPB (1999).
308 Jeroen J. M. Kremers(PAYGO) basis. Second, one must completely withdraw from the labor
market in order to be eligible for the beneﬁts.
These schemes were introduced about twenty years ago, when unem-
ployment was rising rapidly. At the present time, in contrast, the labor
market is increasingly tight. In a number of collective labor agreements,
early retirement provisions for the elderly are gradually being phased out
and replaced by individual saving schemes for younger workers that are
more actuarially fair. Hence, in the future, early retirement can be ex-
pected to be ﬁnanced increasingly through funded rather than PAYGO
schemes.
Unemployment Beneﬁts
The unemployment scheme recently has become a more popular route
for early retirement—due in part to recent measures making the disability
scheme less attractive. Unemployment beneﬁts are especially attractive for
older people, for three reasons: First, the insurance character of unemploy-
ment beneﬁts implies that elderly workers typically have accumulated sub-
stantial insurance rights. Indeed, most people aged sixty and older can
expect to collect unemployment beneﬁts equal to 70 percent of their previ-
ous earnings up to age sixty-ﬁve (in before-tax terms).
Second, another feature facilitating early retirement through the unem-
ployment scheme is that unemployed workers older than 57.5 years need
not apply for work in order to be eligible for unemployment beneﬁts. In-
deed, the number of people collecting unemployment beneﬁts is more than
twice as high as the number of people who are oﬃcially unemployed (i.e.,
are actively looking for work). This indicates that the unemployment
scheme is in fact used as a route for early retirement.
Third, when laying oﬀ elderly workers, employers often provide supple-
mentary severance payments to top-oﬀ the unemployment beneﬁts. In this
way, by providing relatively small supplementary beneﬁts, employers can
ensure that older, laid-oﬀ workers maintain their standards of living in
early retirement. Because the public sector pays for most of the beneﬁts,
the employer does not internalize the full costs of early retirement.
One of the main challenges facing Dutch policy makers is to increase
labor force participation—especially of elderly workers. The labor force
participation rates of younger workers have increased during the past two
decades, due mainly to a higher labor force participation of women. This
can, in fact, be viewed as the other side of the coin of lower fertility. The
participation rate of women between the ages of twenty and sixty-ﬁve,
which has already risen rapidly during the past two decades, is expected
to continue to rise further—from about 50 percent now to about 70 per-
cent in 2020. Indeed, whereas two-earner households at present are about
as common as households with one breadwinner and one nonparticipating
partner, the two-earner family will become the norm in the next century.
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burdened both by raising children and by caring for the older generations
in an aging society, it will become extremely important to raise the labor
force participation of elderly workers. Hence, the incentives to retire early
should be phased out.
Public Pension System
I now turn to the three pillars of the Dutch pension system, beginning
with the ﬁrst. The pay-as-you-go public pension scheme (Algemene Oud-
erdoms Wet, or AOW) is quite vulnerable to aging, a problem that can be
addressed by reducing beneﬁts or by raising taxes or premiums.
Beneﬁts
On the beneﬁt side, the indexation mechanism is crucial. The ﬂat public
pension beneﬁt is indexed to the minimum wage, which is in turn linked
to contractual wages. Despite this eﬀective indexation to contractual
wages, the value of the public pension has declined compared to the aver-
age standard of living during the last two decades. There are two main
reasons for this. First, the minimum wage was frozen during most of the
1980s in order to cut public spending. Second, contractual wages typically
lag behind actual wages because of promotions and other supplementary
earnings that are not included in collective wage contracts. Thus, the pub-
lic pension does not grow in line with the average standard of living. This
is a major reason that the costs of the public pensions (in terms of gross
domestic product [GDP]) do not double between now and 2040, despite
the doubling of the dependency rate during this period.
Most private occupational schemes (i.e., the second pillar) ﬁlled the gap
left by the public scheme to ensure that the sum of occupational and public
pension beneﬁts stayed in line with the average standard of living. By re-
ducing the generosity of the public scheme, the government has in fact
privatized part of pension provision.
Contributions
Kremer’s paper mentions two ways in which the government strength-
ens the ﬁnancing of the public pension: ﬁrst, by ﬁnancing a larger part of
the public pension out of general tax revenues, and second, by building up
a temporary fund that will contain close to 20 percent of GDP by 2030.
It is not clear, however, how eﬀective these measures are. Financing a
larger part out of general tax revenues implies that the elderly contribute
more to the ﬁnancing of public pensions because the wealthier elderly,
who are exempted from paying public pension premiums on their supple-
mentary incomes, do pay taxes on these incomes. By bringing the elderly
within the tax net, the government in eﬀect broadens the contribution
310 Jeroen J. M. Kremersbase. However, the commitment of the government to do so is not very
credible because the elderly are rather powerful politically. Indeed, despite
earlier intentions, both the previous and the current government have in-
creased the public pension premium in order to enhance the purchasing
power of the elderly at the expense of the young.
In the same way, the prefunding of public pension beneﬁts is not mean-
ingful if it is not backed up by ﬁscal surpluses. Whether the fund for public
pensions has any economic meaning will thus depend on future ﬁscal pol-
icy. Because the government has not yet committed itself to such a ﬁscal
policy, the fund is largely symbolic at this stage. Moreover, even if the fund
is ﬁlled by running ﬁscal surpluses, the fund does not seem to be large
enough. Generational accounting exercises suggest that a sustainable ﬁscal
policy requires ﬁscal surpluses larger than the inﬂows into the public pen-
sion fund—even if labor force participation rises substantially during the
next two decades. In particular, these exercises assume that the trend to-
ward higher labor force participation of women will continue, while the
participation of males older than ﬁfty-ﬁve will rise (in part due to lower
invalidity rates; see, e.g., Bovenberg and ter Rele 2000 and CPB Nether-
lands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB; 2000).
Occupational Pensions
Kremer’s paper states that occupational pensions are fully funded.
However, the deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) nature of these pensions, which are thus
linked to wages rather than to rates of return on the capital market, imply
that they also incorporate a PAYGO component on account of intergenera-
tional risk sharing. Indeed, in order to be able to pay wage-linked beneﬁts,
the occupational schemes rely not only on the accumulation of ﬁnancial
assets but also on an implicit contract among the ﬁrm, its workers, and
retirees. If returns are low and wage increases are substantial, the ﬁrm and
its younger workers transfer resources to the retirees and older generations.
If returns are high, in contrast, the transfer of resources goes the other
way around.
Intergenerational risk sharing yields important advantages. The associ-
ated long-term horizon allows pension funds to take advantage of the risk
premium on equity (the so-called equity premium). Indeed, Dutch pension
funds are increasingly investing in equity. This facilitates the investment
of pension saving in high-yield projects in the corporate sector, improves
corporate governance, enhances capital mobility within the corporate sec-
tor, allows a higher expected return over a long horizon, and makes the
return on pension saving less sensitive to unexpected inﬂation.
The price of intergenerational risk sharing is the compulsory nature of
Dutch occupation schemes. This compulsion, however, is broadly sup-
ported by the Dutch population. Only about a quarter of the participants
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fund, which would undermine intergenerational risk sharing.
Challenges Facing Occupational Pensions
Several developments are putting severe pressures on the role of the sec-
ond pillar in ensuring intergenerational risk sharing. First, aging makes
the premiums levied by funded DB systems more sensitive to changes in
the rate of return because aging, together with the maturing of these plans,
reduces the premium base compared to the insured pension rights. Sec-
ond, aging may depress the rate of return and raise wage growth, as it
makes labor more scarce compared to capital.
Third, an increasingly competitive environment and higher labor mobil-
ity associated with a more ﬂexible labor market are reducing the room for
intergenerational risk sharing. Indeed, the DB schemes (which link pen-
sion beneﬁts to wages rather than to the discounted value of individual
premiums) back up the beneﬁt promise not only by ﬁnancial assets, but
also by the market power of the ﬁrm and the commitment of future work-
ers to the implicit contract between generations of workers. In particular,
a ﬁrm can abide by the pension contract only if it earns enough rents to
insure the elderly against low returns without being pushed out of the
market by young ﬁrms that have no retired workers to care for. Exit barri-
ers for young workers ensure that DB schemes can transfer resources away
from younger workers to retirees and older workers. If young workers be-
come mobile across ﬁrms, they cannot be forced to abide by the implicit
contract with the retired and older workers in their new ﬁrms; if a ﬁrm
attempted to tax its younger workers to transfer resources to its retirees,
these workers would move to young ﬁrms without retirees and older work-
ers. As competition intensiﬁes in product, capital, and labor markets, oc-
cupational schemes are thus likely to acquire more features of deﬁned con-
tribution (DC) schemes. In particular, retirees will bear more risks. An
important mechanism through which retirees absorb risk is through the
conditional indexation of pension beneﬁts. Whereas most retirees beneﬁt
from indexation of occupational beneﬁts (to prices or even contractual
wages), this indexation is not a regulatory requirement, but rather condi-
tional on the ﬁnancial health of a pension fund.
Shift to the Third Pillar
The paper correctly states that most occupation schemes aspire to a
beneﬁt level of 70 percent of the gross ﬁnal wage (including the public
beneﬁt). However, even apart from the uncertainty about the indexation
mechanism, many workers do not achieve the 70 percent ﬁnal-wage aspira-
tion level because of incomplete careers. Furthermore, even with full ca-
reers, many two-earner families and single-person households collect a col-
lective pension of less than 70 percent of the ﬁnal wage (in before-tax
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sion for a two-person family with a single earner of 100 percent of the
minimum wage. Two-earner families and singles, however, receive public
pensions of only 50 percent and 70 percent, respectively, of the minimum
wage. Because two-earner families are becoming increasingly important,
the ambition levels of collective pensions are falling. This increases the
room for the third pillar.
Personal Pensions
The third pillar can be tailored to individual tastes with regard to the
insurance level, but lacks intergenerational risk sharing. Interestingly
enough, the paper does not discuss any reform measures for the third pil-
lar. It states that “the third pillar is open to full competitive pressures
within the ﬁnancial market sector.” Even so, the third pillar is ripe for re-
form. In particular, the market for personal pensions is neither very com-
petitive nor transparent. Indeed, some observers maintain that insurance
companies are able to capture a large part of the tax beneﬁts of personal
pensions. Intermediaries are paid by the insurance companies, and admin-
istrative costs are quite high.
Not only the second pillar, but also the third pillar, beneﬁts from tax
privileges. These tax beneﬁts are in part due to the fact that the premium
for public pensions is paid only by those younger than sixty-ﬁve years of
age. Accordingly, individuals can reduce their tax liability by shifting their
taxable income through pension saving toward retirement, when they do
not pay the premium for the public pension.
I very much doubt whether tax beneﬁts that are limited to pension sav-
ing are desirable in view of the need to raise labor force participation of the
elderly—one of the main challenges facing the Dutch economy in years to
come. Indeed, by stimulating pension saving, current tax beneﬁts encour-
age early retirement. In my view, individuals should be allowed to take out
some funds from tax-favored accounts before retirement age—to invest,
for example, in their own human capital or that of their children (by caring
for the children), or to start a business. Hence, individuals could save in
the form of human capital and entrepreneurship. In this way, by investing
early in life in human capital, individuals may be able to work longer.
To reduce reliance on public unemployment schemes that result in ma-
jor disincentives to work, individuals could be allowed to draw on the tax-
favored account during times of unemployment as well—in part, to invest
in training to improve their positions on the labor market. In this way,
these tax-favored accounts would facilitate a less rigid allocation of learn-
ing, working, caregiving, and enjoying leisure throughout the life cycle.
Indeed, these accounts could be viewed as an instrument to insure against
several human-capital risks (due not only to old age but also to unemploy-
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creasing the ﬂexibility in using tax-favored saving, the government may
enhance human capital formation and stimulate entrepreneurship. Indeed,
the main challenge facing the Dutch economy is not so much to increase
ﬁnancial saving, but rather to stimulate entrepreneurship and the accumu-
lation of human capital.
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Discussion Summary
Jeroen Kremers responded to the discussant that as far as early retirement
as an exit from the active workforce is concerned, it is also relevant to
add the element of demotion. The Netherlands are currently thinking of
adjusting the ﬁnal pay-related pension formula so that people are not pe-
nalized by a lower subsequent pension beneﬁt if they stay in the labor force
at a lower wage or as part-time workers. He agreed with the discussant’s
comments on the AOW budget fund and on transparency within the third
pillar of the Dutch pension system. He reported that some aspects of inter-
temporal ﬂexibility as mentioned by the discussant were included in the
original tax reform package. However, they fell out in the last stage purely
for budgetary reasons, and may return to the policy agenda.
Martin Feldstein inquired about the portability of pension claims if
workers move from one sector to another. Jeroen Kremers reported that it
is possible for a worker who moves between companies to take the accrued
beneﬁts along.
Eytan Sheshinski mentioned that there are three means for early retire-
ment in the Netherlands: disability beneﬁts, early retirement, or unemploy-
ment beneﬁts. He asked about the beneﬁt levels compared to each other
and about the incentive eﬀects of the three programs. A. Lans Bovenberg
answered that the early retirement scheme is the most desirable of all three
schemes, because there is no stigma attached to it, and it is used mainly
by high-skilled workers. Low-skilled workers rely more on the disability
scheme and the unemployment scheme. Of these two, the disability scheme
is a bit more attractive because beneﬁts are paid indeﬁnitely, whereas the
unemployment scheme only pays temporary beneﬁts. Bovenberg empha-
314 Jeroen J. M. Kremerssized that the major challenge for the Netherlands as well as for other
European countries is to improve human capital of the low-skilled individ-
uals to keep them employed without reducing their standard of living too
greatly.
David A. Wise asked the discussant what he meant by his statement
that tax beneﬁts encourage early retirement. Wise pointed out that the
employer-provided pensions give enormous incentives for early retirement,
and he wondered how these incentives are related to each other. A. Lans
Bovenberg responded that the Netherlands have large tax incentives to
shift income within the life cycle from a younger age to an older age, so
that the old have a great deal of accumulated wealth and may use that
wealth for early retirement. To prevent early retirement, it might be wise
to keep these tax beneﬁts and allow individuals to use the beneﬁts for
education. According to Bovenberg, one of the main reasons for early re-
tirement is that the workers do not have much human capital once they
reach the age of around ﬁfty-ﬁve. Wise also wanted to know more about
the statement of the discussant that pensions are moving toward a deﬁned
contribution system.
Horst Siebert wondered why the comanagement of the second pillar by
the social partners seems to work in the Netherlands, whereas in the case
of France the point was made that the comanagement leads to high inﬂex-
ibilities. Jeroen Kremers responded by mentioning that inﬂexibility of a
comanaged pension system also means stability. Comparing the Nether-
lands with France, Martin Feldstein remarked that the relations between
social partners are much less confrontational in the Netherlands than in
France. A. Lans Bovenberg added that the attitude between social partners
was more confrontational in the 1980s than it is now. Meanwhile, some
good incentives for social partners to behave have been established. For
example, the link between social beneﬁts and the wage level is dependent
on the ratio between the number of people on social insurance and the
number of people in work.
Reijo Vanne asked how the increasing life expectancy is managed in the
funded second pillar of the Dutch pension system.
Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ mentioned the high reliance of the Dutch system
on the second pillar, the employer-deﬁned-beneﬁt (DB) plans. He won-
dered about the eﬀects of administrative costs or insurance loads charged
in these plans. He asked whether the Netherlands might consider the idea
of opening up an account that is invested in a global index fund as an
alternative to the deﬁned beneﬁt plan of the employers. Jeroen Kremers
agreed that pension funds may have large administrative costs. For that
reason, he reported, the Netherlands have begun policies to increase trans-
parency and to give employers the possibility of leaving the pension fund.
Although the conditions for opting out are so rigid that this may never
happen, the performance of the diﬀerent pension funds is now computed
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from that, standardization in pension funds may also have the eﬀect of
reducing costs. Nevertheless, in the near future there will probably be a
gradual transition toward more room for the third pillar and less room for
the second pillar.
Laurence J. Kotlikoﬀ expressed his concern that the calculations of the
future pension beneﬁts by the employers may not necessarily be honest
and reasonable. It may also be diﬃcult for workers to compare their bene-
ﬁts with the beneﬁts of workers in other ﬁrms. He referred to work by
Kotlikoﬀ and Wise that has shown that DB plans subsidize early retire-
ment in their actuarial reduction factors. Jeroen Kremers responded that
the employers also have a stake in the performance of the pension funds,
because the pension premium is paid jointly by the employer and the em-
ployee. However, Kremers shared the skepticism of Kotlikoﬀ concerning
comparability of the diﬀerent pension funds for the employees, but also
mentioned that an increasing number of funds (including the largest, the
civil servants’ fund, or ABP) have begun to provide employees with easily
understandable statements of accrued beneﬁts.
Ignazio Visco asked about the involvement of the employees in the opt-
ing-out possibility that is given for the case where pension funds have re-
turns below the average.
Assar Lindbeck noted that it was helpful for a country such as Ireland,
New Zealand, Sweden, or Finland to have a serious enough crisis. He
conjectured that the crisis in countries like France and Germany may not
yet be severe enough.
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